Further on My Naval War College Review (Turkey and Cyprus, 1974)

Because All Reviewing is Re-Reviewing

I was honored to publish a book review in the US Naval War College Review. It took almost two years from my reading time until the review’s publication (in the Summer 2022 edition, here). The book I reviewed was Edward J. Erickson and Mesut Uyar’s Phase Line Attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974 (US Marine Corps University Press, 2020).

The Cyprus invasion, an extremely controversial and sensitive subject until today, will become more relevant as 2024 and its 50^th anniversary looms.

Indeed, after reading, one might ponder what geopolitical conditions will affect the orientation of Turkey and Greece to Cyprus in 2024.

Rather than just share the review, I’ll cover some missing elements from my own work. Just as no book is perfect, neither is any book review. One is constantly learning, not only about a book’s subject, but about how to review better.

Also, as is often the case, with this review a strict word limit meant that I couldn’t present my full findings on Phase Line Attila. When a book is very interesting and important, the instinct is to take copious notes; but these cannot all be used in the end. Thus, only a truncated version of what I’d hoped to say was published. In the end, I did not have the space to cover was most important and unique, because somehow I rushed- which doesn’t happen often.

To rectify this omission, I will discuss the key missing aspects, followed by a video presentation from one of the co-authors, Prof. Edward J. Erickson.

But first, some words about the Naval War College and its august journal.

A Venerable American Institution, and its Eminent Periodical

Based right on the waterfront in lovely Newport, Rhode Island, the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) is, according to its website, “the oldest institution of its kind.” Founded in 1884 by Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, it was started “with a desire to better educate the fleet.”

Among the College’s first presidents was the doyen of 19^th-century American naval strategy, Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1917), president from 1886-1889 and in 1892-1893.

In 1885, Admiral Luce had chosen Mahan “to be the college’s first instructor in naval history and tactics,” according to the NWC website. Mahan is important to geopolitical strategy because of his writings (inspired by his research and earlier experience of the American Civil War). For the United States to become a global power, he argued, a strong navy was needed as sea power was key to exerting the requisite influence. In 1890, his doctrine was published in a book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783.

Mahan’s doctrines would influence competing British theories on sea power (by Julian Corbett) and land power (by Halford Mackinder). The cumulative output of these (and some European) theorists provided the basis for geopolitical strategy as we know it today.

Published quarterly since 1948, the Naval War College Review covers public policy topics of relevance to the maritime services. The Review has a great and searchable archive, affording countless hours of reading entertainment for armchair strategists and history buffs alike.

The journal’s many important and innovative works run from (for a few) Robert P. Beebe’s 1957 article “Military Decision from the Viewpoint of Game theory,” to Christopher C. Joyner’s 1989 essay, “Non-Militarization of the Antarctic: The Interplay of Law and Geopolitics,” to Sam J. Tancredi’s 2018 paper “Anti-Access Warfare as Strategy.”

What I Would Have Added to My Review if Space Permitted

Phase Line Attila often mentions, but doesn’t expand on, marvelous anecdotes from the field of battle- this means future historians can use this as a starting point for their own research of those fateful days in summer 1974.

I don’t need to expand on that here; suffice to say that the book’s claim to exclusivity is its reliance on previously (and still) classified Turkish military archives. That any book based on such sources would inevitably read as an apologetic for the invasion, I suppose, comes with the territory.

The upside of this is that we have, at long last, the actual blow-by-blow account of the Turkish invasion, from the Turkish military’s perspective. As the authors note, this will be of interest for any military planners today working on their own amphibious assaults. But it will also aid scholars simply interested in history.

However, researchers should best use this book specifically for the summer 1974 military operation and its tactical planning history- not really for the earlier history of Cyprus leading to that point. That larger history is too big to cover in this book, and even contextual explanations given lead to flawed and simplistic conclusions.

Despite the authors’ contention that the operation was risky and possible to fail, Turkey was destined to win as it had almost no opposition from the side of air or sea power (Greece intervened conveniently little), while the Greek Army’s former battalion of soldiers was long gone by 1974.

In any case, the importance of Phase Line Attila is its detailed approach to the evolution of the Yildiz Atma 70 (Star Drop 70, the 1970 invasion plan) to its final, modified iteration, Yildiz Atma 4, enacted following the coup against Archbishop Makarios in 1974.

The book names the Turkish senior officers in command, their units, specific airports and ports used in all phases of the operations- plus many strange incidents that occurred along the way involving foreign militaries, media and the UN.

For these reasons (not to mention the maps and tables), this book is definitely worth reading for anyone interested in the Eastern Mediterranean or naval warfare in general.

Two Videos: Author Presentation on Phase Line Attila (2021) and a UK Documentary, Cyprus: Britain’s Grim Legacy (1984)

If you don’t have time to read Phase Line Attila, but are still interested in the Cyprus crisis, I have almost 180 minutes of video for you.

First, check out Prof. Erickson’s detailed presentation it, in the 2021 video below before a Turkish audience. He prefaces his discussion by citing his own understanding of military operations from both his careers in the US Army, and later as a professor of military history.

Erickson notes that from the 1960s the Turks began to develop commando and marine capabilities that they had never had, which allowed them to develop formal plans, starting in March 1970.

Another video, also of about an hour and a half, does a great job of explaining the earlier history of the Cyprus problem, from people who were actually involved in prior decades. It is a British television documentary from 1984, marking the then-10^th anniversary of the invasion, and discusses the roots of the unrest going back to the 1940s.

There are some very interesting and useful vignettes here, about the British colonial mindset, the stubbornness of the Cypriot Orthodox Church, and the political developments leading to the invasion. This includes interviews with former diplomats and people connected with decision-making. This includes issues like British strategic troop movements from Egypt to Cyprus and the resulting dissension in parliament, which one British MP was forced into a statement that some colonies could never expect to be completely independent. Fascinating interviews with the former British Field Marshall John Harding, who presented Britain’s compromise formula and had been sent to pacify the violence, is another standout of this historic documentary.

This resulted in the issue being brought to the UN by Greece in 1954, where it was defeated by British efforts. There is even historic footage of Greek Cypriot Colonel Grivas of EOKA and people speaking about him, and the guerrilla action they undertook (ultimately, to the benefit of Turkey) to try and force Britain out. Some of the most gripping footage consists of the historic footage of Archbishop Makarios, as well as the interviews with EOKA veterans who had been given orders to kill fellow Greek Cypriots for various reasons. It was a very strange conflict before it began.

Then, Harding’s recruitment of Turkish Cypriot ‘auxiliary police’ to supplement their own inadequate police numbers, as well as alleged torture of EOKA suspects (and the six-hour shoot-out in the Troodos Mts. Cave in 1957 between the British and EOKA, the documentary interviews the sole Greek Cypriot survivor). During this time, Makarios had been conveniently kidnapped and sent to the Seychelles for re-education.

When Makarios was allowed back to Greece, the Suez Crisis soon occurred, causing Anthony Eden’s resignation. This further added to Britain’s desire to retain military assets in Cyprus, and further strengthened Turkey’s hand in the future of Cyprus, even though its minority there was small and scattered (not, as is often claimed, all concentrated in the north). That, for the most part occurred following the forcible relocation of the two populations after 1974. Then, on the 7^th of June 1958, an explosion at the Turkish consulate started a night of riots in Nicosia, leading to bi-national violence.

Even more explosive tidbits are stated by Greek, Turkish and British sources round out the documentary through the signing of the independence agreement and end of the first phase of violence. The tragic thing about Cyprus is at how many times and how many ways this violence could have been avoided- though this would presume good intentions from the various parties which perhaps never existed.

Cyprus is a strange and complex story – that is, many narratives within an ultimate narrative that is still not clear – one with many moving parts, twists and aspects that probably cannot be understood by us living in the post-Cold War environment. I will consider the possibility of compiling further resources for readers interested in more detailed study of Cyprus and other historical Eastern Mediterranean issues.